



# OBSERVATÓRIO DAS DESIGUALDADES

## WHO IS AFRAID OF DIVERSITY?

Light and shadow in the struggle for  
LGBTQIA+ rights

**Newsletter No. 15**

**April 2022**



*We have the right to be equal when our difference makes us inferior; and we have the right to be different when our equality mischaracterizes us. Hence the need for an equality that recognizes differences and a difference that does not produce, or reproduce inequalities.”*

*(Santos, Boaventura de Sousa)*

The struggle to guarantee the right to be, live, and love is not recent. The landmark of the struggle for LGBTQIA+ rights in the contemporary period is the 1969 Stonewall rebellion. Although not the historical beginning of the LGBT movement, Stonewall is regarded as the “founding myth” of a new phase for the right to gender diversity and sexuality in the West.

Almost 53 years after the rebellion, we still do not guarantee, in law, the consolidation of LGBTQIA+ rights, and we are far from guaranteed, in practice, these rights. After all, we are still the country where the life expectancy of a trans person is 35 years, and we are still the country that recently tried to institutionalize the so-called “gay cure” and terrible

conversion therapies. Despite the gap that still separates us from being a truly welcoming and diverse country, it is impossible to disregard that the struggle of the LGBTQIA+ movement has brought important advances. In Brazil, most of these advances were consolidated in the post-constitution of 1988, more specifically during the center-left governments of the 21st century. However, part of these advances came through the work of the Judicial Branch. In other countries, the movement’s achievements already began in the twentieth century, and in many others, the achievements are even more restricted or null.

In addition to the differences in trajectory between countries, another consideration regarding the

acceptance of the LGBTQIA+ community is that it is diverse, so different groups have different levels of acceptance. It

is, therefore, necessary to briefly describe the meaning of the acronym:

**LGBTQIA +:** Lesbians Gays **Bisexuals** Transsexuals/ **Transvestites**  
*Queer* Intersex Asexuals

The acronym encompasses both diversities of sexual orientation (lesbian, gay, and bisexual), that is, with whom these people relate, fall in love romantically or sexually, as well as gender identities, such as transsexuals, transvestites, and queer. Gender identity refers to how the person identifies as a man, woman, or non-binary (understood neither as a woman nor a man). Asexuality also concerns sexual orientation and are those people who are not sexually attracted to any gender. Finally, intersex people are those born with a reproductive system that differs from the genital organ.

Although they are diverse, the sexual orientations and gender identities that make up the acronym LGBTQIA+ have in

common the rupture of social patterns of imposition of behaviors and feelings. These people suffer different discriminations because their existence and resistance break power structures and social norms to a greater or lesser extent. The struggle for existence and love is long and keeps happening. It is possible to say that there has been progress, but we are still far from breaking with discrimination in all spaces and groups.

It should be noted that there is still great difficulty in accessing data from Brazil and the world about social acceptance and legislation regarding the genders and sexualities that make up the LGBTQIA+ movement.

Most surveys do not deal with the agenda and those who do generally stick to the rights of only homosexual (lesbian and gay) populations. Understanding, therefore, to what extent there is greater or lesser acceptance of LGBTQIA+ people and where the greatest propensities to prejudice and discrimination are located is still an arduous task.

### **Social struggle, political struggle, and rights: three connected arenas**

The purpose of this post is to present a brief overview of the trajectory of acceptance to the community and how different groups behave in relation to the agenda. Hence, data from two international surveys will be used: the *World Values Survey* and the Williams Institute LGBT People Acceptance Index. The WVS data only concerns homosexuals, and the W.I. data concerns the LGBT community.


Although they are not ideal for analyzing the LGBTQIA+ community as a whole, they serve as a thermometer to analyze the trajectory of acceptance to the community and compare this acceptance in different groups. However, it should be stressed that, in general, acceptance is lower, and violence is greater for transgender and transvestite people than for cisgender homosexual people. The data should therefore be analyzed with some caution.

The W.I. index analyzed data from 2000 to 2017 in 174 countries. Research has found that, in general, there is a polarization in community acceptance. This means that in countries whose acceptance was already high, it grew (Netherlands, Finland, Sweden, Iceland, Canada). In countries whose acceptance rate was medium, it remained stable (China), but in countries where acceptance was low, it decreased even more (Somalia,

Azerbaijan, Senegal, Iran). In the Brazilian case, the acceptance trend is increasing, although at

a pace not as accelerated as, for example, in the Nordic countries.

**Graph 1: Trend of the Acceptance Index by Year (Iceland and Brazil)**



Source: Williams Institute

Besides the acceptance index, which considers questions asked to the sample populations of the countries and analyzes the populations' statements regarding the LGBT community, the W.I. also created an index to examine the degree of inclusion in the laws of the countries. To this end, it examined 7 legislations that guarantee rights to the community (in this case, the index refers only to Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual – LGB): decriminalization of homosexuality, authorization to


enter military service, prohibition of discrimination in the labor market, public shelters, recognition of same-sex marriage, equal rights for adoption and constitutional legislation that provides for the prohibition of discrimination by sexual orientation or gender. From these variables, an index of 1 to 5 was constructed, with 1 being the countries with the most exclusionary legislation and 5 countries with the most inclusive legislation (that is, that of the 7 legislations, at least 5

already exist in the whole country).

Legislation from 139 countries between 1990 and

2017 was analyzed and compared with community acceptance indexes.

**Graph 2: Likelihood of countries having a context against LGB inclusion policies, compared to countries with more LGB inclusion policies.**



Source: Williams Institute

The graph above shows that the more inclusive the inclusion policies, the greater the chance the country's population will accept the more the LGB population. While this may seem obvious, it is important to understand that advancing LGB inclusion policies is also the result of a shift in the mindset of country populations.

In Brazil, for example, we went from an inclusive legislation index that was 1 in


1990, that is, there was no law to protect the LGB community, to an index equal to 3 from 2009 to 2016. This means that we move forward, albeit slowly, as reflected in graph 1. On the other hand, it means that (at least until 2016) we are still far from acceptable. An index equal to 3 represents that, of the 7 norms analyzed by the research, Brazil only adopts 3 throughout the territory; there are more inclusive states and judicial decisions. However, they are not

yet consolidated in the formal legislation.

The *World Values Survey*, which analyzes the perception of Brazilians about homosexuality and LGB rights since 1989, also has its

acceptance index. In the WVS index, acceptance may be low, medium, or high, and from the available data, it is possible to observe the trajectory of community acceptance in Brazil.

**Graph 3: LGB acceptance index in Brazil per year**



Source: *World Values Survey*

In the graph, two trends are shown. The first is that, in fact, acceptance has been growing steadily, as also demonstrated by the W.I. data. On the other hand, the graph also shows that low acceptance fell considerably fast until 2009, which is the year in which there was the most considerable advance in the index of inclusion of Brazilian legislation,


according to the W.I. From 2009, low acceptance continues to fall, but at a less accelerated pace. It should be noted, however, that as of 2010 the mean acceptance (which has been growing) falls and is surpassed by high acceptance. This may indicate that the acceptance process is gradual, but continues to advance.

## Advances and resistances in recognition of LGBTQIA+ rights

Nevertheless, this acceptance process is not homogeneous in all social groups in Brazil. The graphs presented below were taken from WVS, and the data are

from 2017. The blue columns represent a low level of acceptance, the orange ones a medium level, and the green ones a high level of acceptance. Columns that represented unfilled answers or whose answer was “I don’t know” were removed from the graphs for better visualization.


**Graph 4: LGB x sex acceptance**



Source: *World Values Survey*




**Graph 5: Acceptance of LGB people x Reaction to the statement: 'Men are better political leaders than women's**



Source: World Values Survey

**Graph 6: LGB x age acceptance**



Source: World Values Survey

It can be seen from the graphs that there is greater acceptance of LGB people among women and younger people. Regarding gender, it should be noted that females are mostly cisgender women, and males are mostly cisgender

men. In general, broken gender standards are less accepted by men than women, an expression of the sexism and patriarchy that mark Brazilian society.


The relationship between sexism and homophobia exists

precisely because there is broader discrimination related to gender. Patriarchal ideology has two central perspectives: the first is the understanding of two gender roles rigid and linked to sexual orientation and sex, and the second is the supremacy of the male over the female gender. The patriarchal structure depends on the consolidation of these two ideas to enable the maintenance of the privileges (material, cultural, and social) of white cisgender men. Thus, when looking at

graph 5, it is possible to perceive that those individuals who agree with a sexist statement are more likely to discriminate against the LGB community as well, precisely because LGB people challenge the patriarchal ideology and the rigid structure of gender/sexual orientation/sex.


There seems to be a generational approach about age: the younger, the greater the acceptance of LGB people.

**Graph 7: LGB Acceptance x Income Level**



Source: *World Values Survey*

**Graph 8: LGB Acceptance x Educational Level (reclassified into 3 levels)**




Source: *World Values Survey*


Graph 7 shows that both the highest and the lowest social classes have lower levels of acceptance, and the middle classes generally have a medium level of acceptance. Nonetheless, there is no clear correlation between higher income and lower acceptance

in the case of other social groups, nor does the higher level of acceptance follow this pattern. Graph 8 shows a clearer relationship between higher educational levels and higher acceptance levels. This indicates that education probably impacts acceptance and tolerance more than income.

**Graph 9: LGB Acceptance x Urban/Rural Residence**



Source: *World Values Survey*

**Graph 10: LGB acceptance x declared religious group**

Source: *World Values Survey*

Graphs 9 and 10 present two other important divisions to understand the phenomenon of intolerance or non-acceptance of LGB people in Brazil. Graph 9 shows different acceptance levels of LGB people in rural and urban areas. According to the survey data, there is a greater acceptance of homosexuality in the Brazilian urban environment in relation to the rural environment, where the low acceptance rate is much more recurrent than in the urban environment. In the case of Graph 10, there is a greater acceptance of the community among people who declared to have no religion or who have other non-Christian religions.

The acceptance profile of people who declared themselves Catholic is very close to the Brazilian profile, in general. There are more people with low acceptance than high, but these numbers are close. In the case of people who declared themselves Protestant or evangelical, there is the highest percentage of low acceptance (44%), and it is also the group that registers little high acceptance. The data is worrying, even because the population of evangelical people in Brazil is large and has been growing.

Thus, from the data taken from the surveys, it is possible to elaborate some hypotheses.

First, it would be necessary to consider the other groups that make up the LGBTQIA+ community in research, especially those that collect international data, to really understand the phenomenon and vulnerabilities. Secondly, Brazil has advanced both concerning the population's acceptance and legislation. However, it has been progressing slowly and is still far from ideal, even if compared to other countries, both legally and socially. Finally, it should be noted that the cultural and social heterogeneity present in Brazil makes the acceptance of the LGB community also very heterogeneous. Religion, age, gender, and education are the main divisions.

### **Social change, democracy, and pluralism**

The above data allow us to reflect on the conflicts surrounding the formation and recognition of the legitimacy of identities that emerge in the

modernization processes of societies. Traditional societies are generally less differentiated in roles and identities – there are few professions and religions, socialization is much more by family or religion, etc. In this type of society, most social roles and identities are assigned and imposed on people regardless of their actions, choices, or merits, but resulting largely from birth conditions. The identity (that is, how one sees oneself and how others see one), the values, the expectations, the course of life and its opportunities, as well as the position of people in social hierarchies, depends on the family in which one is born, their ethnicity, their sex, eventually the religion of their relatives, the occupation of their parents, and other factors of this nature. There is a very limited margin for individuals to modify and move away from these identities and roles. When they do, they are usually dramatic disruption processes: religious conversions lead to

accusations of heresy, choice of non-marriage or marriages outside family standards lead to moral depreciation or ridicule, and in more severe cases, exclusion from the family, and so on.

As societies modernize and become more complex, so do social roles, identities, and positions occupied by individuals. People start to have and to transit, in a very differentiated and singular way, between different identities: one can be at the same time Catholic (or evangelical, or atheist, or adept of candomblé); from Minas Gerais (or São Paulo or Maranhão); married (or single, or widowed, or divorced, and other variations); engineer (or teacher, or mason, or many other professions); political or social activist, among many other possibilities. In different people or moments of life, one or more of these identities and roles may or may not be more relevant or defining.

But more importantly, when societies become more complex, they would tend to open windows of opportunity to also become more plural, more uncertain life trajectories and more autonomous individuals, to the exact extent that new emerging actors and marginalized social groups can gather strength to advance social transformation. This window opens because the trend of modernization would be that the weight of the factors assigned to individuals would be reduced. In a feudal society, for example, the conditions of birth – for example, a noble, commoner or servant, man or woman – determines one's position, alternatives, opportunities, and much of one's fate. In modern society, on the contrary, it is expected that the inherited (assigned) factors will lose more importance in relation to those conquered or chosen throughout a person's life. Thus, it is not legitimate to prefer a candidate for a job because of their gender, color,

or other factors. Still, only because of their qualifications, experience, education, previous performance, and factors acquired or conquered throughout life. Therefore, it is also completely fallacious to justify in meritocratic terms inequality in a country where, for example, race, gender, or region of birth are central determinants of a person's educational and occupational opportunities, as is the case in Brazil.

In short, a modern, democratic, and plural society contributes to the emancipation of its citizens, which means that it seeks to build and value the autonomy of individuals. Thus, we will be more autonomous the more the identities and social roles that we assume and to which we commit are those that we choose freely to experience socially and that allows us to realize ourselves; also when these choices do not mean restrictions or limitations on our

opportunities and chances of life. Ultimately, a free and democratic society of emancipated citizens is one in which each person, using the words of the philosopher Hannah Arendt, is the author of themselves. When we cannot question the identities that we inherit or are imposed on us, and we are obliged to embrace social roles that we do not choose, under penalty of suffering social (or even legal) sanctions or being discriminated against, the only term for this is oppression.

This does not mean that the ideal of a modern and democratic society would be that of a gathering of atomized individuals, in which each generation would overlook an entire history, traditions, or ancestry, even because this is impossible. A set of values, cultural mediations, and shared worldviews are not contradictory elements with the notion of autonomy; they are rather components of it. What is

expected is that people will be able and free to awareness and a reflective distance from the inherited values, identities, interdictions, and loyalties and can, throughout life, rebuild them, if they so wish or deem correct.

Another corollary of the combination of the complexification of modern societies, democracy, and autonomous citizenship is that our relations and how we are treated must reflect our plurality and the richness of diversity and never reduce us to one-dimensional beings, defined solely by belonging to a group or segment – socioeconomic, racial, religious, sexual orientation, gender, or any other – and, even less, establish some hierarchy or segregation from them, which is the very essence of discrimination, prejudice, and, at the limit, the constitution of ghettos and different forms of *apartheid*.

## **Social institutions, fundamentalism, and discrimination against LGBTQIA+**

Well, to what extent does all this discussion help us understand the advances and some focuses of resistance to the recognition and acceptance of LGBTQIA+ rights and ways of life? First, is it necessary to reflect on why other types of prejudice and discrimination – even if existing and widespread – are frowned upon and often camouflaged and denied. In contrast, prejudice, widespread moral condemnation, and discrimination against LGBTQIA+ are seen as legitimate even by broad sectors of various societies (including Brazil), and only recently has their hateful and violent nature been more decisively questioned?

From an ethical and civilizational point of view, nothing justifies this attitude, but understanding its roots helps to overcome it. In a



society, we are immersed in a network of social relations and social institutions, which are a set of norms, values, and worldviews that shape our actions, aspirations, judgments about others and ourselves, our tastes, and preferences among so many other dimensions of our lives and attitudes. And the more an institution is consolidated and comprehensive, the less people can see it and assess it as what it is – always one among other possibilities of regulating social life and that, therefore, can be judged and modified from higher values – and the more they see it as the only acceptable possibility or part of the natural order of things and societies. In such a way the maximum of institutionalization is when this set of norms, values, and roles is not even seen as a human institution, but as part of nature itself, so rooted that its questioning is so costly socially and psychologically, that refusal, denial, or different forms of aggression are

sometimes easier options, even if more harmful and impoverishing for society.

The sexual division of labor and gender roles are among the oldest sets of institutions that accompany human societies, from the oldest records of societies of nomadic hunters and gatherers. Thus, over time, gender roles and identities – social institutions that, therefore, can and should be questioned, modified, and chosen in a free society – are so objectified that they are perceived as inseparable or even components of biological sex. Thus, gender equality and the right to choices of gender identities with which one can live freely, without sanctions or prejudice, their sexual orientation, are among the greatest challenges to the emancipation of people, to the constitution of free, democratic, and plural societies.

As stated above, this helps us understand more about the advances and vicissitudes of

LGBTQIA+ rights in Brazil. The modernization and the long and permanent struggle of broad sectors of society and social movements for the democratization of Brazil boosted, especially at the turn of the century until the first decade of the 2000s, the acceptance of sexual diversity and the recognition of their rights in Brazil. Why, then, are there important foci of resistance to this advance? From the data presented above, two dimensions are relevant to reflect: religious resistance and a sexist and patriarchal conception of society.

As it turned out, one of the greatest sources of resistance has a religious origin: some religious denominations and, mainly, the centrality of religion in the person's life. There is nothing intrinsically reactionary or discriminatory in religion; at various times and circumstances, religious inspiration was a backbone of social transformation

movements and a force for those who sought justice: in the struggle for civil rights in the USA (Martin Luther King and Malcolm X were leaders with religious ties); the strength of the Basic Ecclesial Communities, Dom Hélder Câmara, Minister Wright, and Rabbi Sobel in resisting the dictatorship, and in the struggle for human rights in Brazil are just a few among so many examples in which faith sustains the social struggle. Nevertheless, fundamentalism is a form of religious relationship that serves the status quo and is generally encouraged and manipulated by those who benefit from it.

In such a conflicting and ungenerous moment of social coexistence in Brazil, we see the combination of three related, but distinct phenomena: fundamentalism(s), polarization, and social fascism. They have in common their exclusionary character, the hostility to difference, the little propensity

to dialogue, to a concession. Finally, being strongly affective and emotional phenomena, they tend to be equally resistant to reason and facts, valuing loyalty rather than fidelity as guides of action and positioning.

Among the three phenomena, fundamentalism is the most properly religious, although it can be used to characterize some secular movements. Following Peter Berger, we can say that fundamentalism has 3 central characteristics. The first is that fundamentalism is always reactive (and usually reactionary). It presents itself as a reaction to a perceived threat to a set of values around which a religious community is organized. Here is a note, because this point allows us to understand that, although it also occurs in secular groups, fundamentalism in its most finished form is more typically a religious phenomenon. The most secular human groups

and organizations are constituted from values and identities as well, but recurrently around the search for much more instrumental objectives of a varied nature: the mutual care and socialization of young people, the search for better conditions of life, the dispute and the exercise of power (for whatever purpose it is intended to be exercised), in addition, of course, to the search for profit, production of goods and services, maintenance of order, etc., etc. Religious groups and communities, at least in principle, have their reason for being organized in terms of certain symbols, values, and doctrines, and not around pragmatic or instrumental goals, even if they exist. Therefore, the perception of a threat to the group's values represents an even more central threat to the very existence of the community.

Well, fundamentalism then always arises as a response to a

perceived threat to integrity or loyalty to the values that are believed to be constitutive of a community. Under current conditions, this perceived threat usually comes from the process of secularization, from a certain moral relativization and acceptance or appreciation of diversity in ways of living, in central values and lifestyles in society, and from the coexistence of varied identities in the constitution and the daily life of its members. That is, precisely those typical elements of the process of social modernization. Therefore, besides being reactive, fundamentalism is usually reactionary in the sense of defending or returning to a state of loyalty and real or imaginary purity (almost always imaginary) of a lost or threatened tradition.

And this is the second element of fundamentalism: it is a modern phenomenon. Fundamentalism appeals to tradition, but it is a child of

modernization. It is modern because it almost always uses very modern means of promotion, dissemination, and connection (televangelism, WhatsApp groups, social media, persuasion and propaganda techniques, etc.). But it is modern mainly because it arises from a tradition's weakening, transformation, or relativization. And so it is very different from traditionalism. Traditionalism is that situation in which a set of values and norms of conduct is so institutionalized in a society that they are seen almost as the natural order of things, without questioning as if it were not a choice among others possible. Thus, the traditionalist can be more relaxed, less strict, and even more tolerant of people who do not share the same values. They are seen as exotic, or mistaken, or inferior, denying the obvious; the exception only confirms the rule.

For the fundamentalist, their faith and their worldview

are not natural. It is conscious, an object of attention whose existence, adherence, and strength must be permanently assured and demonstrated to themselves and to others. The fundamentalist has a defensive certainty, conquered and maintained with effort, which is far from being the natural order of things and is constantly put at risk by questioning, relativization, and living with "others". These others, therefore, pose a threat: they must be avoided, segregated, converted, or, ultimately, symbolically or physically expelled or exterminated.

The third fundamentalism characteristic, says Berger, results from the other two: fundamentalism is an attempt – or presents itself as such – to recover the non-questioning of a tradition, calling for a return to an immaculate past of fidelity or devotion. But existence in human communities and organizations is never immaculate; in our best

moments, we are imperfect attempts to live up to what we dream. Therefore, the immaculate past to which fundamentalism appeals is more imagined, idealized, or even recreated than real. And, in any case, tradition cannot be resumed as a brake on modernization. From this point of view, fundamentalism is constitutionally fragile and precarious as a project. Therefore, reiterated, it has to be continuously defended and often aggressiveness in doing so. It is a psychological mechanism by which the fundamentalist seeks not only to impose their certainties on the other, to demonstrate the sincerity of their adherence or conversion to a group, but is also a way of producing in themselves the emotional and affective engagement that sustains their belonging to the group and avoids possible questions.

Once the main characteristics of

fundamentalism have been established, a crucial question arises. If fundamentalism implies a) a permanent, emotional, and immoderate affirmation of beliefs, values, or norms and a community or group and b) coexistence in a society that, to a large extent, does not share these same values and represents, in the view of fundamentalists, a threat to them, it remains to be seen how fundamentalist groups will relate to this society. There are, according to Berger, two fundamentalism models. One is the sectarian model, in which the group seeks to protect itself from the infidels. That is, there is no pretension – or decided effort – to impose their belief on society. The answer is to avoid questioning or doubt by the community's isolation in relation to the cognitive contamination that visions and external contacts can mean for the group. It is the known phenomenon of subculture or sectarianism. The most literal way to do this is by

geographic isolation, constituting a community in a remote zone. We all know several examples of this type of isolation: from the alternative communities of the hippie movement to religious groups such as quakers, Amish, and others.

The other version of fundamentalism is more dangerous: it is what Berger calls fundamentalism "achievement", in which one seeks to overcome the tension between the ideal of the group's tradition and the perception of society in degeneration by the effort to shape society in the image of the group, to impose on others what they believe to be the virtuous and true behavior, organization, demonstration of faith. At the turn of the 21st century, in Brazil, some religious groups and leaders, especially but not only from denominations called neo-Pentecostals, used the transition from the "sectarian"

model to the “achievement” model of fundamentalism to transform religious capital into political capital and religious organization into a media organization.

The reaction to the modernization and secularization of customs and morals was, in the absence of a structured theology or eschatology, the main driver of this movement or strategy. And then, we understand the instrumentalization of several scarecrows – gay cure, gay kit, gender ideology, erotic bottle, and many other scams and boggarts that serve the moral panic and the interdiction of rational public debate. From this point of view, the opposition to certain religious fundamentalism is, paradoxically, rather the result and sign of the social advance of the agenda and LGBTQIA+ rights.

### **Conservative modernization in a sexist and patriarchal society**

But the modernization of societies is not a neutral process, without subjects and conflicts. Traditional societies, social institutions, cultures, values, and symbols structure, consolidate, and transmit hierarchies and relations of power and oppression in societies. And the same goes for modernization processes. An important American social scientist, Barrington Moore Jr., coined a very useful and influential term to consider the Brazilian case: conservative modernization.

For him, conservative modernization is a process in which some fields of social life are transformed based on “modern” social relations (capitalist, bureaucratic, and democratic). In contrast, others remain structured on traditional and hierarchical bases (social relations based on coercion, archaic land structures, clientelist political oligarchies, and hierarchies based on assigned and status elements,

such as gender and race). Moore saw conservative modernization as the path to modernity in countries where the elites allowed industrialization, and promoted some level of education and state-building while trying to maintain society's order and status quo through corporate and authoritarian agreements that included non-market forms of control.

The development of Latin America illustrates this path: guaranteeing access only to certain dimensions of modernity (the possibility of living in cities, having a certain level of education, being an industrial worker), but not to others (belonging to the middle class, reaching certain consumption capacities, full democratic citizenship). These pressures and imbalances periodically generate crises of incorporation. The anomie crisis caused by status inconsistencies could result in

populist, democratic, or revolutionary experiences.

This long digression seems distant from the theme, but in fact it also helps to make sense of the persistence of other sources of resistance to LGBTQIA+ rights. The above data show that, among men and those who share a patriarchal conception of power and politics, the acceptance of the diversity of sexual orientations is much lower. In a society marked by conservative modernization such as Brazil, the expansion of rights, and the valorization of diversity threatens one of the pillars that maintain a vertical and hierarchical organization of society: sexism and patriarchy, which, together with racism, maintain current inequalities that date back to colonial society.

Finally, what has now become clear is that the struggle for LGBTQIA+ rights is, in fact, an expression of a dispute over the nature of



society and our modernization process: will we be able to commit ourselves and move towards an open, democratic, and plural society or will a crisis of incorporation increase the limits of our conservative modernization, renewing the mechanisms of exclusion and oppression that, in the end, only serve a small male, white, oligarchic elite?

Even in the face of an ultra-conservative extreme

right-wing hangover that has reinforced, in recent years, a reactionary and violent discourse against the LGBTQIA+ population, it is impossible to deny that we have moved forward. Further progress is needed, and even if resistance puts an infinitely greater weight on the shoulders of these people, the struggle has to be one of all. A fairer and more respectful society is possible. Go for it!

## STAFF

The Observatory of Inequalities, a partnership between the João Pinheiro Foundation and the Regional Council of Economy – MG, is an extension project of the Public Administration course, which seeks to contribute to the debate on the different faces of social inequality, disseminating and making the knowledge and information on the subject more accessible. The views expressed in this newsletter do not necessarily represent the position of the institutions.

### **Fundação João Pinheiro**

Chairman: Helger Marra Lopes

Vice Chairperson: Mônica Moreira Esteves Bernardi

Director of the School of Government: Maria Isabel Araújo Rodrigues

### **Corecon-MG**

Chairperson: Tânia Cristina Teixeira

Vice Chairperson: Gustavo Aguiar Pinto

Executive Manager: Marco Aurélio Loureiro

### **Observatory of Inequalities**

Coordination: Bruno Lazzarotti Diniz Costa

Matheus Arcelo Fernandes Silva

Interns: Alexandre Henrique Martins da Fonseca

Augusta Cora Lamas Lopes

Extension students: Anna Clara Ferreira Mattos

Clara de Oliveira Lazzarotti Diniz

Preparation of this edition: Clara de Oliveira Lazzarotti Diniz and Bruno Lazzarotti Diniz Costa.